tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-47803789510446182862024-03-13T01:43:07.485-07:00Hummings in the Fly-BottleUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger127125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-40402766486638153112016-10-13T11:57:00.000-07:002016-10-13T17:25:28.300-07:00"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"<div id="fb-root">
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It bothers me when Christians speak of love, that is, the kind of love they believe to be uniquely Christian, such as when they instruct themselves or others to "love thy neighbor as thyself" (<i>Matthew</i> 22:39) or "love your enemies" (<i>Matthew</i> 5:44). It is not that they speak as if all Christians have such love, or that it is easy to love your enemies or love thy neighbor as thyself. They may be the first to admit it is very difficult to love like that. What bothers me is rather that they seem to think it is just clear what they speak of is <i>love</i>. It is not clear at all. They can certainly give it a name, "Christian love" say, but naming something does not by itself make it clear what exactly is being named, nor does doing so make the thing named easier to understand, or even intelligible.<br />
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You can forgive and do good to your enemies, pray for thy neighbor, or help strangers, but what is it to love them? Perhaps Christians think "X loves Y" is a formula such that you can substitute "X" and "Y" with <i>anyone</i> and what relates them can still be love. But love isn't like that. Whether you can love someone depends, among other things, on how you see them or what you understand them to be. If you understand someone to be your enemy, or just your neighbor, or a total stranger, can you still love them? Maybe you can, but this is at least not a straightforward question that has a clear answer.<br />
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That's why I saw a kindred spirit in Rush Rhees when I was reading these remarks by him: "The way in which Christians speak of love seems to me one of their most perplexing and (for me) one of the most discouraging sides of their teaching." ("Christianity and Growth of Understanding", in <i>Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy</i>, edited by D. Z. Phillips, Cambridge University Press, 1997). In the same essay Rhees also points out another problematic aspect of "Christian love", namely, the power it is supposed to have:<br />
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<i>In the Gospel the story of the good Samaritan seems to be intended to give the sense of 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself'; and this commandment ... or am I wrong? I was going to say that Christians seem to look on this commandment as a rule which, if only it were followed, would solve all the difficulties in human relations. And when I think of it in that crude form, my jaw drops.</i><br />
<i><br /></i>Rhees thinks this "commandment", in "that crude form", does not tell you "much about your relations with people you have to live with day by day". And it is, I would like to add, through living with these people that you acquire a robust sense of what it is to love someone.<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-64143795311330826392016-04-07T22:34:00.000-07:002016-04-07T22:48:18.043-07:00Reverse-engineering good prose?<div id="fb-root">
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Chapter 1 of Steven Pinker's <a href="http://stevenpinker.com/publications/sense-style-thinking-persons-guide-writing-21st-century" target="_blank"><i>The Sense of Style: The Thinking</i> <i>Peron's Guide to Writing in the 21st Century</i></a> has an unimaginative title: "Good Writing". The subtitle, however, is quite a contrast to it: "Reverse-Engineering Good Prose as the Key to Developing a Writerly Ear". The first piece of advice on writing well that Pinker gives to the reader is indeed this:<br />
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<i>[T]he starting point for becoming a good writer is to be a good reader. Writers acquire their technique by spotting, savoring, and reverse-engineering examples of good prose. </i>(p.12)<br />
<i><br /></i>Although spotting and savoring good prose is certainly easier said than done, the advice is at least clear. But what exactly is it to reverse-engineer good prose? "Reverse-engineering" is a metaphor here, but it is not altogether clear what it is a metaphor of. Pinker does go on to demonstrate how to reverse-engineer good prose. He picks "four passages of twenty-first-century prose, diverse in style and content" and tries to "understand what makes them work"(p.12). These passages are supposed to be examples of good prose, and what he does is analyze why they are good. It seems that by "reverse-engineering good prose" Pinker simply means reflecting on and analyzing what makes a piece of prose good. If this is all there is to reverse-engineering good prose, I don't think "reverse-engineering" is an apt metaphor for the practice.<br />
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Reverse-engineering is taking apart an object to see how it works, usually for the purpose of duplicating the object. The object is designed, with components organized and connected in specific ways so that the different functioning parts work severally or together to make the whole object work. It may seem that a piece of good prose is analogous to a designed object. Some may even think that a piece of good prose <i>is</i> a designed object, and hence that "reverse-engineering" is not a metaphor here. There is no need to quibble over the expression "designed object", for we can grant that a piece of good prose is a designed object and still have a good reason to insist that reflecting on and analyzing what makes it good prose is not like, or is not, reverse-engineering.<br />
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Here's the reason. Although there can be more than one approach to reverse-engineering a particular object, there can only be one correct result of "This is how it works". And the resulting "This is how it works", if correct, has to be complete --- nothing can be added. If two people attempt to reverse-engineer an object and both succeed, they will agree on how the object works. Reflecting on and analyzing good prose is not like this. Two people can agree that a piece of prose is good, but after reflecting on and analyzing the piece disagree on what makes it good prose. Their analyses may both be correct, and both be incomplete. This is because these two people pay attention to or value different aspects of the piece given their different sensibilities, and they may discover different new good things about the piece when they reflect on and analyze the piece further.<br />
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Spotting and savoring good prose already depends on our sensibilities; what Pinker calls "reverse-engineering good prose" is a practice that helps us strengthen the sensibilities we have, or even develop new ones. Calling it "reverse-engineering" is misleading because the practice is not merely a matter of making discoveries, but also a process of changing ourselves.<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-840093845930185562015-11-21T03:32:00.000-08:002015-11-21T21:20:59.589-08:00The test of the eternal recurrence<div id="fb-root">
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Nietzsche's idea of the eternal recurrence first appears in <i>The Gay Science</i>:<br />
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<i>What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence - even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!' </i><br />
<i><br /></i>
<i>Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: 'You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine.'</i><br />
<i><br /></i>
<i>If this thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing, 'Do you want this again and innumerable times again?' would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! </i>(341)<br />
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Unless one has already read <i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i> and consequently had the understanding that Nietzsche's idea of the eternal recurrence is a cosmology, there is no way one would read Nietzsche as suggesting anything cosmological here. What Nietzsche presents here is, as Bernard Williams puts it, "an entirely hypothetical question, a thought-experiment" ('Introduction' to the Cambridge edition of <i>The Gay Science</i>). Our responses to the thought-experiment reflect our attitudes towards our lives. The thought-experiment can thus be seen as a test of whether one affirms one's life: if one answers 'yes' to Nietzsche's question ('Do you want this again and innumerable times again?'), then one passes the test of the eternal recurrence, that is, one affirms one's life. The answer 'no' may not be outright nihilistic, but it is at least unsettled and dubious.<br />
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However, even understood merely as a thought-experiment rather than a cosmological doctrine, the idea of the eternal recurrence still invites a host of questions. Will I remember 'my' past lives? The answer is presumably 'no', for otherwise the lives in the eternal recurrence will not be identical ("all in the same succession and sequence") because of the ever-increasing extra knowledge in later lives. But if I don't remember those prior lives, what makes them <i>my</i> lives? Or, to put it reversely, if the later person will not remember my life, what makes his life a recurrence of mine?<br />
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Even if I can put these questions aside and understand the recurring lives as all mine, I may not have reason to care about any of them except <i>this one</i>. Since my recurring lives have to be identical, in each of them I do not know that it is a repetition of prior lives. The lack of such knowledge in each life logically follows from the fact that in the very first life of the series I do not have such knowledge. But if in each life I do not know that it is a repetition, then what reason do I <i>now</i> have for minding that my life will be repeated? If my later selves won't mind, why should I mind for them? And if I don't, and won't, mind the repetitions, how can the eternal recurrence be a good test for the affirmation of life? (Note that for the thought-experiment to be coherent, if I ask the demon whether my life is already a repetition, the demon will have to either always answer 'no' or erase my memory of having met him.)<br />
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None of the above questions should be dismissed lightly, because what the test of the eternal recurrence requires is not our hasty judgments or knee-jerk psychological responses but our considering Nietzsche's question, in Williams's words, "seriously and in the fullest consciousness". Hasty judgments or knee-jerk psychological responses are not sufficient for the affirmation of life.<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-79479806408665751452015-06-12T12:32:00.000-07:002015-06-12T12:46:15.789-07:00Nietzsche's looseness<div id="fb-root">
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John Searle recounts, in his engaging and entertaining article "Oxford Philosophy in the 1950s" (<i>Philosophy</i> 90 (2015)), what Bernard Williams told him about Nietzsche:<br />
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<i>Bernard tended to admire philosophers who were outside the </i><i>mainstream. He discovered Nietzsche when he was already well advanced </i><i>in philosophy, and though he was contemptuous of </i><i>Nietzsche’s looseness at first, he became as much a follower of </i><i>Nietzsche as he was capable of being of any other philosopher. He </i><i>once said to me about Nietzsche that he thought it was ‘about 80% </i><i>true’. I cannot imagine any other philosopher of whom Bernard </i><i>would say that. I think he especially liked Nietzsche’s cynicism </i><i>about mainstream academic life and academic philosophy. </i>(p.188)<br />
<i><br /></i> What intrigues me the most is certainly Williams's claim that what Nietzsche says is "about 80% true". That's an unusually strong claim for any philosopher to make about any other philosopher. Another fascinating fact here, and a related one, is that Williams "was contemptuous of Nietzsche's looseness at first". What the phrase "at first" implies is not that Williams ceased to think Nietzsche's thinking was loose after he became a follower of Nietzsche; rather, it implies that he was not contemptuous of Nietzsche's looseness anymore. Williams admired Nietzsche <i>in spite of </i>his looseness.<br />
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I did not consider the possibility that Williams ceased to think Nietzsche's thinking was loose for the simple reason that Nietzsche's looseness is conspicuous. <i>Beyond Good and Evil</i> 267 is a perfect example:<br />
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<i>The Chinese have a proverb that mothers even teach children: </i>siao-sin<i> </i><span style="font-family: MingLiU; font-size: 16px;">—</span><i> "make your heart </i>small<i>!" This is the characteristic fundamental propensity in late civilizations: I do not doubt that an ancient Greek would recognize in us Europeans of today, too, such self-diminution; this alone would suffice for us to "offend his taste." </i><span style="font-family: MingLiU; font-size: 16px;">—</span><br />
<i><br /></i>
"Siao-sin" is presumably a transliteration of the Chinese expression "小心". Not only does it not mean "make your heart small", it is not a proverb either, and hence not "a proverb that mothers even teach children". Although "小" means "small" and "心" means "heart", "小心" does not mean "small heart"; it means "be careful", which does not seem to have anything to do with "self-diminution". Such a mistake could have been avoided easily.<br />
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But perhaps Nietzsche simply didn't care <span style="font-family: MingLiU; font-size: 16px;">—</span> it's just a mistaken example; he's not using it as evidence to support his view. If he was right about "the characteristic fundamental propensity in late civilizations", i.e. self-diminution, it would not be difficult for him to find correct examples. For Nietzsche, insights first, examples later.<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-12722308285039105222015-02-08T00:53:00.000-08:002015-06-12T10:39:11.241-07:00A little knowledge<div id="fb-root">
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}(document, 'script', 'facebook-jssdk'));</script> I've just come across an intriguing remark by Nietzsche in <i>Human, All Too Human</i>:<br />
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<i>A little knowledge is more successful than complete knowledge: it conceives things as simpler than they are, thus resulting in opinions that are more comprehensible and persuasive. </i>(578)<br />
<i><br /></i> Let us put aside the question whether anyone can have complete knowledge of anything, for what Nietzsche says won't be affected much if "complete knowledge" is replaced with "adequate knowledge" or "sufficient knowledge". First of all, note the "it" in "it conceives things as simpler than they are", which refers to "a little knowledge" rather than to the knowing agent. This sounds strange, because "a little knowledge" does not have a mind and cannot think. The German original is "es kennt die Dinge einfacher, als sie sind", and the literal translation of "es kennt" should be "it knows". Of course "it knows" does not sound any less strange than "it conceives", but I think what the whole expression means is "this is knowledge of things as simpler than they are". The "it" in "it conceives" or "it knows" is a dummy pronoun.<br />
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So, a little knowledge is knowledge of things as simpler than they are. Or more precisely, a little knowledge of X is knowledge of X as simpler than X really is. But why does "a little" imply "simpler"? This is because what is involved is knowledge of X rather than knowledge of <i>part of</i> X. If one's knowledge of X is little in the sense of being knowledge of merely part of X, then it is not necessarily simpler --- one's knowledge of part of X can be as complex as it (i.e. the part) really is, while the knowledge is still little compared to knowledge of the whole X. However, if it is knowledge of the whole X, it cannot be both little but <i>not</i> simpler.<br />
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A little knowledge results in "opinions that are more comprehensible and persuasive". Here the opinions are obviously opinions of the knowing agent --- the opinions are more comprehensible and persuasive to the knowing agent. But why are the opinions more comprehensible and persuasive to him? Well, because they are based on knowledge of things as simpler than they are. It is the simplification that makes the opinions comprehensible and persuasive. If the agent sees things as they really are, the complexity involved will perplex and humble him.<br />
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Nietzsche says "[a] little knowledge is more successful than complete knowledge". Successful in what sense? I can think of only one answer: successful in the sense of being treated as knowledge. The more one knows, the more one is not sure that one knows.<br />
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<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-2826548612895391732014-08-20T20:48:00.000-07:002014-08-20T20:49:20.305-07:00Visions and arguments<div id="fb-root">
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In an interview Hilary Putnam was asked "What makes a good philosopher?"; his response, though vague, was candid and enlightening:<br />
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<i>No one thing. Just as there are different sorts of poet and different sorts of scientist, there are different sorts of philosopher. What made Kierkegaard a great philosopher was not the same thing that made Carnap a great philosopher. If one has to generalize, I would agree with Myles Burnyeat who once said that philosophy needs vision and arguments. Burnyeat's point was that there is something disappointing about a philosophical work that contains arguments, however good, which are not inspired by some genuine vision, and something disappointing about a philosophical work that contains a vision, however inspiring, which is unsupported by arguments.</i> (Andrew Pyle (ed), <i>Key Philosophers in Conversation</i>, p.44)<br />
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He did not elaborate on these remarks, simply adding that "'vision', 'argument', and 'support' can mean many different things". These words certainly can mean many different things, but whatever they mean, it seems that the two kinds of disappointment Putnam spoke of can still be characterized a bit further in a completely general way: Arguments not inspired by some philosophical vision are disappointing because it is not even clear why we should take them seriously in the first place; a philosophical vision not supported by arguments is disappointing because it may very well be nothing but an intellectual fantasy. To mimic Kant: Arguments without a vision are blind; a vision without arguments is empty.<br />
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The relation between philosophical visions and arguments is, to some extent, analogous to that between scientific theories and confirmatory experiments. There is, however, an important difference. A scientific theory usually carries implications for how it can be confirmed experimentally, but a philosophical vision does not carry implications for how it can be supported by arguments. If there is a theory (about some kind of natural phenomenon) such that no experiment can be designed, at least in principle, to confirm it, it is doubtful whether it should be considered scientific at all. By contrast, a philosophical vision that is not supported by arguments may not be considered any less philosophical. Another way of putting it is that philosophy is more tolerant of empty talk than science is. This may be, alas, why there is more bad philosophy than bad science.<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-42297502962537744492014-04-29T15:48:00.000-07:002014-04-29T16:09:59.314-07:00Living forwards and changing the past<div id="fb-root">
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In Milan Kundera's <i>The Book of Laughter and Forgetting</i>, the narrator makes the following arresting remarks about the past and the future:<br />
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<i>People are always shouting they want to create a better future. It's not true. The future is an apathetic void of no interest to anyone. The past is full of life, eager to irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it. The only reason people want to be masters of the future is to change the past.</i><br />
<i><br /></i>
These remarks make an interesting contrast with what Kierkegaard famously says about life (in his journal for the year 1843):<br />
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<i>It is perfectly true, as philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards. But they forget the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards.</i><br />
<i><br /></i>The two passages are at least in tension, if they don't seem outright contradictory. If life "must be lived forwards", how can the future be "an apathetic void of no interest to anyone"? And if we can "change the past", doesn't that mean there is a sense in which life can be lived backwards? Both passages are insightful, and I think there is a way of understanding them so that they are not only compatible but also support each other.<br />
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First of all, we all know that the past cannot be changed, not literally. Our understanding of the past, however, can change. The past is important to us because "life must be understood backwards", and we can't help living forwards with a particular understanding of the past. It is the understanding of the past that counts, not just the past in itself. Although the same past can be understood differently, we can't change our understanding of the past at will. But we can change it indirectly, that is, by living forwards in a particular way. This is the sense in which people can "change the past" by being "masters of the future".<br />
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But why are living forwards and changing the past related this way? Because the past and the future form a narrative, and this is how we see our lives --- as stories unfolding. Different possible futures would result in different stories and hence different contexts in which the same past could be understood very differently. The past is already, as it were, written, but the future is, we believe, still open. The future in itself may be seen as an "apathetic void", but it is of great interest to us when seen as part of a continuous story.<br />
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What we want to create is not a better future (understood independently of the past), but a better life story --- better in the sense that the past can be understood in a way that makes it less likely to "irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it".<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-70893309126879154682014-02-11T20:47:00.000-08:002014-02-11T20:47:03.148-08:00Fine-tuning and OmnipotenceThe fine-tuning argument is an attempt to show that the universe is designed. The basic idea of the argument is simple: the parameters of physics and the initial conditions of the universe are such that if some of them, such as the cosmological constant and the gravitational constant, were slightly different, the universe would not have existed. There might still be a universe, but a short-lived or unstable one that does not allow life chemistry, and hence no life --- the universe is intentionally fine-tuned for life.<br />
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Let us assume that the physics used in the argument is all correct. Let us even assume that there is no other explanation of the apparent fine-tuning of the universe than that the fine-tuning is actual and intentional. That is, let us assume that the universe does have a fine-tuner or designer.* Call the designer <i>D</i>. What attributes should we ascribe to D? It is clear that D has to be extremely intelligent and powerful (designing a whole universe is no small task!), but do we have reason to believe that D is omniscient and omnipotent?<br />
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Although D does not have to be omniscient to design the universe, D may be omniscient. We have no reason to think one way or the other as far as the fine-tuning argument is concerned. However, if D is intelligent enough to avoid doing things that are unnecessary, we do have reason to believe that D is <i>not</i> omnipotent. Consider the following argument:<br />
<br />
(1) D fine-tunes the universe for life.<br />
(2) If D is omnipotent, D does not need to fine-tune the universe for life.<br />
(3) D is intelligent enough to avoid doing unnecessary things.<br />
(4) Therefore, if D fine-tunes the universe for life, D needs to do it that way. [from (3)]<br />
(5) Therefore, D needs to fine-tune the universe for life. [from (1) and (4)]<br />
(6) Therefore, D is not omnipotent. [from (2) and (5)]<br />
<br />
Anyone who accepts (1) and (3) has to accept the conclusion that D is not omnipotent if she also accepts (2). People who employ the fine-tuning argument certainly accept (1), and it is safe to assume that they accept (3) as well. Do they accept (2)? They have to accept it if they accept all of the following claims:<br />
<br />
- If D is omnipotent, D is capable of creating life that is not carbon-based.<br />
- If D is omnipotent, D is capable of creating life of some form in a universe that is utterly different from ours (with different parameters of physics and initial conditions).<br />
- If D is omnipotent, D is capable of creating life of some form even in a short-lived and unstable universe.<br />
<br />
They have no reason not to accept these claims because none of the consequents of the conditionals describes an ability to do something that is logically or metaphysically impossible.** So they have no reason not to accept (2).<br />
<br />
If God is omnipotent, then D is not God. This is presumably disappointing news for those who employ the fine-tuning argument.<br />
<br />
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* The fine-tuning argument does not give us any reason to think that there can only be one designer, but for my purposes here it's not necessary to consider the possibility that there is more than one designer.<br />
** Some philosophers argue that 'omnipotence' is an incoherent concept. Here I assume for the sake of argument that the concept is coherent and that the only things an omnipotent being is incapable of doing are those that are logically or metaphysically impossible.<br />
<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-6990111896913254652013-11-07T12:09:00.000-08:002013-11-07T12:31:51.797-08:00Having fun with Žižek<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Let us ruminate over the following little speech by </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">Slavoj Žižek:</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><i>You know,
happiness is for me a very rebellious category. It enters the frame immediately. You
have a serious ideological deviation at the very beginning of a famous
proclamation of independence -- you know, happiness is overrated. If there is a
point in psychoanalysis, it is that people do really want or desire
happiness, and I think it’s not necessarily bad that it is like that. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><i>For
example, let’s be serious: when you are in a creative endeavor, in that
wonderful fever --- “My God, I’m onto something!” and so on --- you're mimicking happiness. You are ready to relish the real thing. Sometimes scientists --- I read history of
quantum physics or earlier of radiation --- were even ready to stomach the whole package, including the possibility that they will die because of some radiation and so on.
Happiness is, for me, an amoral category.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><i>And also,
we may actually want to get what we think we don't want. The classical story that
I like, the traditional monogamous scenario: I am married to a wife,
relations with her are great, and I think I don't want a mistress, and all the time I dream,
“Oh my God, how terrible if I had a mistress . . . ,” I’m not a saint, but let
us say, “A new life is terrifying and a mistress would open up a new life for me.” You know what
every psychoanalyst will tell you quite often happens? That then, for some
reason, you have a mistress, you realize you have wanted a new life all along.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><i>You
thought, this is not what I want. When you had it there, you found out that it was a
much less complex situation, where what you want is not really to love another woman but to keep her as an object of desire and nothing more. And this is not an excessive situation. I claim that this is how
things function. We really want what we think we don't desire.</i><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Pretty
profound, right? Only that it is not really a speech by Žižek. The real speech
is here, the content of which is almost the opposite of the above ‘speech’:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br /></div>
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="300" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/U88jj6PSD7w?feature=player_detailpage" width="505"></iframe><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">I would
like to suggest a criterion for fake profundity: <o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">Any seemingly profound words have fake profundity if they still look
profound after being ‘oppositized’.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"><br /></span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-10730696015253084652013-10-18T23:07:00.000-07:002013-10-19T22:18:47.466-07:00Knowing the truth versus avoiding errorNormally, we want to know the truth and we want to avoid error. There is no reason why we can't achieve both. William James argues, however, that these are "two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion"; not just two ways, but "ways entirely different". As he explains:<br />
<br />
<i>[T]hey are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws. Although it may indeed happen that when we believe the truth A, we escape as an incidental consequence from believing the falsehood B, it hardly ever happens that by merely disbelieving B we necessarily believe A. We may in escaping B fall into believing other falsehoods, C or D, just as bad as B; or we may escape B by not believing anything at all, not even A. </i>(James, 'The Will to Believe')<br />
<i><br /></i>Avoiding error indeed does not guarantee knowing the truth, but the relation between these "two separable laws" is much closer than suggested by James's explanation. In most cases when a person acquires the <i>true</i> belief that p, she thereby avoids the error of believing that ~p. The avoidance of error in these cases is not just "an incidental consequence", for it has to do with the logical relation between p and ~p. Certainly we all have inconsistent beliefs, but if a person is aware of believing that p, she cannot at the same time believe that ~p (unless the belief is unconscious). This is especially so when the belief acquired is a result of <i>rational inquiry.</i><br />
<i><br /></i>
James's target here is William K. Clifford, who advocates the principle that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" (Clifford, 'The Ethics of Belief'). Call this <i>Clifford's Principle</i>. As James understands it, Clifford's Principle "treat[s] the avoidance of error as more imperative [than the chase for truth], and let[s] truth take its chance"; for James, Clifford's Principle is in effect "Better go without belief forever than believe a lie". If this was how Clifford's Principle should be understood, then we could follow the principle simply by refraining, insofar as we can do so, from acquiring new beliefs. No new beliefs, no new <i>false</i> beliefs.<br />
<br />
But this understanding can't be correct, for Clifford's Principle is a principle of rational inquiry. Rational inquiry is a pursuit of truth (some would argue it is a pursuit of knowledge, but knowledge entails truth), and a principle that can be followed simply by not acquiring new beliefs is not a principle of rational inquiry. No new beliefs, no new <i>true</i> beliefs either.<br />
<br />
If we follow Clifford's Principle, we won't have unjustified beliefs. Since unjustified beliefs are more likely to be false than true, we can avoid error by following Clifford's Principle. But avoiding error this way is for the sake of knowing the truth; it is a means rather than an end. What Clifford's Principle explicitly tells us is that it is wrong to have unjustified beliefs, but the implicit message is that we should have justified beliefs. And the purpose of having justified beliefs is not avoiding error, but knowing the truth.<br />
<br />
James finds it "impossible to go with Clifford" and is "ready to be duped many times [...] rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true". He believes that "worse things than being duped may happen to a man in this world". He is right, and one of those things is being duped and thinking it is a way of knowing the truth.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-38686462439721170512013-08-25T11:38:00.000-07:002013-08-25T14:15:46.312-07:00"What if you're wrong?"Richard Dawkins's answer to the question "What if you're wrong?" (asked by a Liberty University student at Randolph College in 2006) received so much attention that <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mmskXXetcg" target="_blank">the short video</a> of his rapid-fire little speech got over three and a half million hits on YouTube. Someone has made an animated collage which nicely illustrates Dawkins's points:<br />
<br />
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="300" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/beYYZRN1sEs?feature=player_detailpage" width="505"></iframe><br />
<br />
Although Dawkins used a lot of examples, he made his main point clearly when he said "there's no particular reason to pick on the Judeo-Christian god, in which by the sheerest accident you happen to have been brought up". His point is not:<br />
<br />
(1) Since you have acquired your religious beliefs in such and such a way, these beliefs are questionable (or false).<br />
<br />
It is:<br />
<br />
(2) You would have acquired utterly different religious beliefs if you had been brought up in a different religious tradition, and these different sets of religious beliefs are equally unjustified. So you have no more reason to accept one of them rather than the other.<br />
<br />
(1) is an instance of the genetic fallacy, while (2) merely points out the lack of justifying reason for preferring one religion over another. That (2) is Dawkins's main point is also supported by his last remark: "What if you're wrong about the great Juju at the bottom of the sea?"<br />
<br />
Dawkins's main point is clear enough (which explains why it is so forceful), but it doesn't stop someone like William Lane Craig from insisting that Dawkins committed the genetic fallacy:<br />
<br />
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="300" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/CBTbWdGR1MY?feature=player_detailpage" width="505"></iframe><br />
<br />
Craig the great strawman maker... (Sigh). Alvin Plantinga, who is a more sophisticated thinker than Craig, fails to offer a more reasonable response to Dawkins's main point. Actually, he's responding to Philip Kitcher, but Kitcher's point is the same as Dawkins's:<br />
<br />
<i>For all their doctrinal disagreements, Muslims, Jews, and Christians agree on many things. If, however, you had been acculturated within one of the aboriginal traditions of Australia, or within a society in central Africa, or among the Inuit, you would accept, on the basis of cultural authority, radically different ideas. You would believe in the literal truth of stories about the spirits of ancestors and about their presence in sacred places, and you would believe these things as firmly as Christians believe in the resurrection, or Jews in God's covenant, or Muslims in the revelations to the Prophet.</i> (Living with Darwin: Evolution, Design, and the Future of Faith, p.141)<br />
<br />
Plantinga's response sounds a bit deeper than Craig's, but is no less missing the point:<br />
<br />
<i>Kitcher points out, as others before him have, that most believers accept the religion in which they have been brought up. And that can be worrying: if I had been brought up in medieval China, for example, I would almost certainly not have been a Christian. Fair enough; and this can induce a certain cosmic vertigo. But doesn't the same go for Kitcher? Suppose </i>he<i> had been born in medieval China, or for that matter medieval Europe: in all likelihood, he would not have been skeptical of the supernatural. As I say; this can induce vertigo; but isn't it just part of the human condition? </i>(Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism, p.62)<br />
<br />
Again, Kitcher's (and Dawkins's) point is not that religious beliefs are questionable because believers have been brought up to accept those beliefs, but that believers have no more reason to accept the religious beliefs they have rather than some other religious beliefs. Kitcher makes the point straightforwardly this way:<br />
<br />
<i>The trouble with supernaturalism is that it comes in so many incompatible forms, all of which are grounded in just the same way.</i> (p.142)<br />
<br />
Since these incompatible forms of supernaturalism are grounded in just the same way, we have no reason to prefer one form over another. Most believers stick to their religious belief simply because they have been brought up to accept them blindly.<br />
<br />
It is indeed part of the human condition that we have all been brought up to accept certain beliefs, but it is not part of the human condition that we should not question these beliefs. Plantinga is right that Kitcher would not have been skeptical of the supernatural if he had been born in medieval Europe, but that doesn't mean Kitcher's skepticism about the supernatural is no more justified than medieval religious beliefs --- they are not incompatible forms of the same kind of belief system that are grounded in just the same way.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-23546507848581922352013-06-30T14:48:00.000-07:002019-04-18T00:46:47.545-07:00Proving a negativeA. C. Grayling remarks in his short essay 'Proving a Negative' (in <i>Thinking of Answers</i>, pp.32-34) that "[t]he claim that negatives cannot be proved is beloved of theists who resist the assaults of sceptics by asserting that the non-existence of God cannot be proved." (p.32) It is indeed not uncommon for a theist to challenge an atheist with the question 'Can you prove that God doesn't exist?', where the rationale for posing the question is that it is impossible to prove a negative. It is, however, a little strange that Grayling does not mention also the fact that some atheists (and agnostics) like to invoke this very same principle of folk logic when they argue against theism: they would insist that the burden of proof lies with the theist because it is impossible to prove a negative but possible, and sometimes easy, to prove a positive.<br />
<br />
In any case, it is puzzling why there are so many people who accept the principle that it is impossible to prove a negative, for the principle seems obviously false. If 'a negative' means simply 'a negative proposition', then anyone who accepts the law of non-contradiction (i.e. '~(p & ~p)') has to accept that there is at least one negative that can be proved: the law of non-contradiction is a negative proposition and it can be proved in classical logic. Relatedly, propositions of the form "'p' is not false" are negatives in this sense. Assuming bivalence, proving that 'p' is not false is equivalent to proving that 'p' is true --- unless propositions of the form "'p' is true" cannot be proved, it is possible to prove a negative.<br />
<br />
Perhaps for those who accept the principle in question 'a negative' here means 'a negative existential proposition' (i.e. a proposition of the form 'There is no x' or 'x does not exist'). Grayling does not tackle the question why people accept the principle in question, but he does give a simple counterexample: "consider how you prove the absence of pennies in a piggy-bank. You break it open and look inside: it is empty." (p.34) I think most people would agree that doing so proves the negative 'There are no pennies in the piggy-bank'. So, even when 'a negative' means 'a negative existential proposition', it is still clear that a negative can be proved.<br />
<br />
Perhaps the universe of discourse is supposed to be unrestricted when the principle in question is applied. It is easy to prove that there are no pennies in the piggy-bank, but, it may be claimed, it is impossible to prove that there are no unicorns, period (though it can be proved rather easily that there are no unicorns in your closet). There are two problems here. First, if the difficulty of proving that there are no unicorns anywhere in the universe is due to our technological limitations, then those who accept the principle in question have to clarify what they mean by 'impossible' when they claim that it is impossible to prove a negative. It is at least not a metaphysical or logical impossibility. Second, it is not clear that the universe of discourse matters here. It may be easy to prove that there are no unicorns in your closet, but it is difficult to prove that there are no <i>invisible</i> unicorns in your closet. And it seems impossible to prove that there are no unicorns of the following kind in your closet: unicorns that are <i>undetectable</i> unless they allow you to sense their presence.<br />
<br />
If it is impossible to prove that God does not exist, it may be because God is undetectable unless God allows us to sense her presence, rather than because 'God does not exist' is an unrestricted negative existential proposition. It remains a puzzle to me why there are so many people who accept that it is impossible to prove a negative.<br />
<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-21596384215031841772013-05-19T08:17:00.001-07:002013-05-19T08:18:53.435-07:00The normativity of life's meaningfulness<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The
question about the meaningfulness of one’s life is a normative question, and an
answer to it is a normative judgment. If I understand that a meaningful life is
better than a life that is not meaningful, and judge that my life is
meaningful, I will see that the judgment has normative implications for what I
should think, what I should do, what I should be, and what I can reasonably
expect of others as far as their evaluative attitudes toward my life are
concerned. If others agree with my judgment that my life is meaningful, they
will see the same implications.</span><br />
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">As Christine
Korsgaard points out, “[c]oncepts like knowledge, beauty, and meaning, as well
as virtue and justice, all have a normative dimension, for they tell us what to
think, what to like, what to say, what to do, and what to be” (<i>The Sources of Normativity</i>, p.9; italics
added). When we apply these concepts to make judgments, we make normative
judgments. This is the case when the concept of meaning (or meaningfulness) is
applied to a human life. Suppose I ask the question about my life’s meaningfulness
and answer it positively, that is, I make the judgment that my life is
meaningful. Such a judgment has implications for me with respect to my thought
and action: it is not just that the judgment implies some possible things that
I can think or do; it is that it makes claims on me and I admit that it has
authority over me. In other words, I feel the normative force of the judgment
that my life is meaningful.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Why does
the judgment that my life is meaningful have normative authority over me? First
of all, such a judgment is not subjective --- it is not, as some may put it,
just a matter of one’s opinion. The judgment that my life is meaningful is
intersubjective or interpersonal. And second, the judgment has to be justified,
rational, or supported by good reasons. I am rationally compelled by the
judgment to think or act in certain ways rather than others. Putting these two
aspects together, the judgment ‘My life is meaningful’ is, as Allan Gibbard
puts it in his discussion of normative authority, “interpersonally valid” (<i>Wise Choices, Apt Feelings</i>, p.155).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">When I
judge that my life is meaningful, not only do I have a positive evaluation of
my life, a positive answer to the question of who I am, and a good reason for
my existence, I also have a clear answer to the question of how I should live
my life --- what I should think, what I should like, what I should say, what I
should do, and what I should be. It is difficult to see how the judgment can
have normative implications for me and for others, and can significantly
constrain or direct my life, if I understand the meaningfulness of my life to
be something purely subjective, something depends solely on what I happen to
believe, feel, desire, or value. In order to have normative authority over me,
such a judgment has to be, like other normative judgments, at least in some
respect intersubjective if not objective too. The normative force of such an
evaluative judgment has to come, at least partly, from something beyond my
subjective perspective in the sense that the correctness of the judgment is not
simply up to me.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">This is
why there is a significant difference between ‘My life is meaningful’ and ‘My
life is meaningful <i>to me</i>’. I would
not be altogether satisfied if the latter was all I could truly say as an
answer to the question about my life’s meaningfulness. There would be something
wrong with my understanding of meaningfulness if I believed that my life is
meaningful simply because it is meaning to me. In this respect judgments about
meaningfulness are like judgments about beauty: if I want to know whether I am
beautiful, the answer ‘I am beautiful to me’ is not going to be good enough to
me. Even if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, there has to be at least one
beholder other than oneself.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-31442456309196623132013-04-12T13:55:00.001-07:002013-04-12T13:55:27.995-07:00Death and meaningfulness (II)<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Why do
some of us think death implies meaninglessness? One plausible explanation is
that when we are deeply unnerved by the unavoidability of our death, we may
confuse the end of our lives with the end of everything. Of course we all know
that the world continues to exist after we die, but it is easy to go from the
thought that we will no longer see the world after we die to the thought that </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">for us</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> the world does not exist after we
die. Surely ‘for us the world does not exist’ is still different from ‘the
world does not exist’, but it is just a small step to go from there to the
thought that </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">for us</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> there is no
difference between the two. If for us the world does not exist after we die,
and if we see meaningfulness as part of the world, then for us meaningfulness
does not exist after we die. Again, ‘for us meaningfulness does not exist’ is
different from ‘meaningfulness does not exist’, but it is also just a small
step to arrive at the depressing thought that </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">for us</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> there is no difference between the two.</span><br />
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">The
problem with this series of thoughts is that there is no ‘for us’ after we die.
‘For us the word does not exist’ is nothing but a confused way of thinking
about our death: ‘For us the world does not exist after we die’ does not say
anything more than the trivial truth ‘We are dead after we die’. For those who believe that we continue to
exist consciously in some form after we die (i.e., after our earthly lives
end), it does make sense to speak of ‘for us’ after we die. But if we believe
that we live on after death, we should not believe also that for us the world
does not exist after we die, though we do not live in the earthly world any
more. In either case, there is no reason for us to think that death implies
that our lives are meaningless.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Another
plausible explanation of why we may conclude that life is meaningless when we
think about death is that we may confuse the end of our lives with the end of
everything <i>about our lives</i>. Tolstoy
seemed to be having such a confusion when he wrote that death “obliterates
everything: myself, my works and the memory of both” (<i>A Confession and Other Religious Writings</i>, p.33). Of course Tolstoy
knew that his death would not obliterate everything; what he meant was
presumably that his death would obliterate everything about his life. But even
that, as I have already pointed out, is not true: his works were not
obliterated by his death and we still read them today. Let us, however, imagine
that Tolstoy’s works (and everything that belonged to him or was created by
him) were obliterated at the very moment of his death and that no one
remembered him or his works after he died. Tolstoy seemed to think that his
life would be meaningless if that happened, but he did not explain why he
thought so. Perhaps it was because for him the thought was obviously true;
after all he did say that “once sober it is <i>impossible
not to see</i> that it is all a mere trick, and a stupid trick” (p.31, italics
added). But in fact it is far from
obvious.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Tolstoy’s
works still exist and are read by many people; would his pessimistic view that
death implies meaninglessness have been changed had he known that his works and
the memory of him would not be obliterated by his death? The answer seems to be
‘No’, for he had every reason to believe, and did believe, that his works and
the memory of him would last for a long time, but he still held that
pessimistic view. What really bothered him was the fact that <i>eventually</i> his works and the memory of
him will be obliterated. Now we should see that according to Tolstoy what is
necessary for meaningfulness is immortality --- even if his works would not
last forever, if he lasted forever, his life could still be meaningful.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Again,
Tolstoy did not explain why he thought immortality is necessary for
meaningfulness. Some of us would agree with Tolstoy on this or even think Tolstoy
was obviously right, but we have to keep in mind that without offering any
justification for believing that immortality is necessary for meaningfulness,
the belief may simply be a rationalization of our desire to continue to live.
At the very least we cannot simply take the belief to be obviously true. Indeed, some philosophers argue for the
opposite. Bernard Williams, for example, argues in his brilliant essay ‘The
Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality’ that “[i]mmortality,
or a state without death, would be meaningless, … in a sense, death gives the meaning
to life” (Williams, <i>Problems of the Self</i>,
p.82). If we find it hard to accept that immortality is undesirable, that, as
Williams also puts it, “an eternal life would be unliveable” (p.100), it is at
least reasonable to think that a life <i>can
be</i> meaningful without being immortal. In any case, instead of arguing
directly for this reasonable view of the relation between meaningfulness and
immortality, I am going to present a dilemma to those who think that
immortality is necessary for meaningfulness.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">The
dilemma is this: either we understand immortality in terms of human life as we
live it, in which case we have no reason to believe that the meaningfulness of
life of this kind requires that the life be endless; or we understand
immortality in other terms, such as in terms of disembodied existence, in which
case it is not clear that we have any idea of what it is for that kind of life
to be meaningful. If an earthly human life <i>cannot
</i>be meaningful, why would lengthening it (endlessly) make any difference as
far as meaningfulness is concerned? In fact, it seems more reasonable to think
that if human life as we live it is meaningless, then living such a life
endlessly is equally meaningless, if not more so. The other horn of the dilemma
is even more intractable. For we can at least understand the idea of an
immortal human life in which we continue to do the kinds of things human being
are in fact doing or capable of doing, but if an immortal life is supposed to
be <i>utterly different</i> from human life
as we live it (and it is undeniable that a disembodied life is utterly
different from an earthly human life), then we simply do not understand what it
is like to live such a life, and hence do not understand what would make such a
life meaningful.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">It should
be noted that none of what I have said suggests that death is not a bad thing.
There are cases in which we can reasonably say that death is not necessarily a
bad thing to happen to the person involved, but this certainly does not imply
that death is always not a bad thing to happen to a person. In fact, it usually
is a bad thing. But even if it is bad for a person to die <i>now</i> given the person she is and given the life she is living, it
does not follow that it is bad that she will die later. And even if it is
necessarily a bad thing for her to die, no matter when, it does not follow that
her life <i>before she dies</i> is
meaningless.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-39425125807649708592013-03-28T21:49:00.000-07:002013-03-28T21:49:01.898-07:00Death and meaningfulness (I)<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">It is
clear why thinking about death naturally leads to reflection on life: death is
the termination of life. It is not, however, as easy to understand why thinking
about death may lead to the conclusion that (one’s) life is meaningless or that
(one’s) life is not meaningful enough because of death. No one has expressed
more directly than Tolstoy did the thought that death threatens meaningfulness:</span><br />
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Today or tomorrow sickness and death
will come (and they had already arrived) to those dear to me, and to myself,
and nothing will remain other than the stench and the worms. Sooner or later my
deeds, whatever they may have been, will be forgotten and will no longer exist.
What is all the fuss about then? How can a person carry on living and fail to
perceive this? That is what is so astonishing! It is only possible to go on
living while you are intoxicated with life; once sober it is impossible not to
see that it is all a mere trick, and a stupid trick! That is exactly what it
is: there is nothing either witty or amusing, it is only cruel and stupid. </span></i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">(Tolstoy, <i>A Confession and Other Religious Writings</i>, translated by J. Kentish
(London: Penguin Books, 1987), p.31)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">And he
asked, rhetorically, “[I]s there any meaning in my life that will not be
annihilated by the inevitability of death which awaits me?” (p.35) Since the inevitability of death awaits not
only Tolstoy but all of us, what he said was supposed to apply to all human
beings: death will annihilate any meaning in our lives. The implicit idea here
is that if life really has meaning, it must consist in something that can
defeat the threat of death to meaningfulness. In other words, life is
meaningless unless we can find some kind of long-lasting and grand
meaningfulness.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">What
reason did Tolstoy give for thinking that death implies meaninglessness? It
seems to be simply this: whatever one has achieved “will be forgotten and will
no longer exist”. Literally this is not true, at least not true of Tolstoy, for
his writings still exist and we still read and appreciate them today. What
Tolstoy had in mind might well be this: sooner or later, if not in ten thousand
years, then in a million years, we will all be dead and nothing we have
achieved will still exist. In a million years, there will not be any human
beings; there probably will not be any intelligent beings on this planet to
appreciate and value what some human beings have achieved or created; there
will not be any traces of <i>War and Peace</i>
or <i>Anna Karenina</i>. Tolstoy’s
conclusion seems to be that because of this none of the things anyone of us has
achieved matters at all.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Let us
grant that none of the things anyone of us has achieved will matter in a
million years, but this is different from saying that none of the things anyone
of us has achieved matters. ‘X does not matter’ does not follow from ‘X does
not matter in a million years’. Besides, as Thomas Nagel argues:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">It is often remarked that nothing we
do now will matter in a million years. But if that is true, then by the same
token, nothing that will be the case in a million years matters now. In
particular, it does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now
will matter. Moreover, even if what we did now were going to matter in a
million years, how could that keep our present concerns from being absurd? If
their mattering now is not enough to accomplish that, how would it help if they
mattered a million years from now?</span></i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">
(Nagel, ‘The Absurd’, in <i>Mortal Questions</i>,
p.12) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">In terms
of meaningfulness rather than mattering, we can say that the fact that in a
million years there will not be anyone to consider one’s life meaningful does
not imply that one’s life should not be considered meaningful. If one’s life is
meaningful now, it is still a meaningful life even if no one in the further
future will remember one’s life.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">It seems
that most of us would agree that a meaningful life will not cease to be
meaningful simply because something happens in the future after the person
whose life it is dies. Indeed, most of us would agree that a life does not even
have to be long to be meaningful. Obvious examples are Mozart and Anne
Frank. But then why do some of us think
death implies meaninglessness? Why is it so natural for some of us to conclude
that life is meaningless (or not meaningful enough) when thinking about death?
It is as if before we think about death, we see our lives as meaningful, but
the meaningfulness suddenly disappears once we think about death.</span> <span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Why?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-14254874855033356562013-02-14T17:50:00.001-08:002013-02-14T22:57:09.448-08:00Clashing vanitiesNietzsche has the following observations about people with vanity:<br />
<br />
Clashing vanities. <i>Two people with equally great vanity retain a bad impression of one another after they meet, because each one was so busy with the impression he wanted to elicit in the other that the other made no impression on him; finally both notice that their efforts have failed and blame the other for it. </i>(<i>Human, All Too Human</i>, section six, 338)<br />
<br />
These observations seem right, but only roughly. A person who is trying hard to impress others will probably not be able to pay attention to things other than whether he succeeds in his attempt, and hence not be able to be impressed by others. But this is true of everyone, not just vain people. Nietzsche seems to be suggesting that people with vanity are more likely to try hard to impress others than people without vanity (are there such people?), for otherwise the phrase "with equally great vanity" could be deleted and he would still be making the same point.<br />
<br />
Let's say Nietzsche is right, that is, that a vain person likes to impress others. However, it is reasonable to think that a vain person would not try to impress just anyone. Being vain, he would try to impress people who have impressed him in the first place, for it is impressing such people that would satisfy his vanity as far as impressing people is concerned.<br />
<br />
Now suppose that two people with equally great vanity met, and that they tried to impress each other because each of them had been impressed by the other in some way. If they both failed in their attempt to (further) impress the other for the reason mentioned above, it is not clear they would blame the other for the failure. Indeed, the more they had been impressed by the other, the less likely they would blame the other for the failure. The psychology is fairly simple: the more they had been impressed by the other, the more they would understand why they failed to impress the other --- a person so impressive would not be easy to impress. In that case, their failure to impress does not hurt. And for people with vanity, if it doesn't hurt, it doesn't matter.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-73452992649472375702012-10-12T22:58:00.000-07:002012-10-14T00:40:30.741-07:00History and value<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">At
the beginning of </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Curtain: An Essay in
Seven Parts</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">, in a section entitled ‘History and Value’ (pp.4-6), Milan
Kundera discusses the relation between historical consciousness and aesthetic
evaluation. He introduces the issue with an imaginary case:</span><br />
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Let us
imagine a contemporary composer writing a sonata that in its form, its
harmonies, its melodies resembles Beethoven’s. Let’s even imagine that this
sonata is so masterfully made that, if it had actually been by Beethoven, it
would count among his greatest works. And yet no matter how magnificent, signed
by a contemporary composer it would be laughable. At best its author would be
applauded as a virtuoso of pastiche.</span></i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Kundera
is well aware of a possible, and natural, response to the above evaluation of
the contemporary composer’s anachronistic piece. Indeed, he mimics such a
response:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">What? We
feel aesthetic pleasure at a sonata by Beethoven and not at one with the same
style and charm if it comes from one of our own contemporaries? Isn’t that the
height of hypocrisy? So then the sensation of beauty is not spontaneous,
spurred by our sensibility, but instead is cerebral, conditioned by our knowing
a date?</span></i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">But
he insists that there is “[n]o way around it: historical consciousness is so
thoroughly inherent in our perception of art that this anachronism (a Beethoven
piece written today) would be <i>spontaneously</i>
(that is, without the least hypocrisy) felt to be ridiculous, false,
incongruous, even monstrous”. Put more straightforwardly, his point is that “it
is only within the context of an art’s historical evolution that aesthetic
value can be seen”.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Is
Kundera right about the relation between historical consciousness and aesthetic
evaluation? This is a big topic and I won’t attempt to show that Kundera is
wrong. What I would like to point out is that he might have conflated aesthetic
experience and aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic experience necessarily has phenomenological
features; by contrast, although aesthetic judgment is usually accompanied by
aesthetic experience, the judgment itself is cerebral and does not have to have
its own phenomenology. In Kundera’s own words, there is “aesthetic pleasure” or
“sensation of beauty”, and there is “perception of art” or “aesthetic value [that]
can be seen”; my point is, the two don’t overlap perfectly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">The
main subject matter of Kundera’s book is the (modern European) novel, but since
he uses a musical example in the passage quoted above, let me use another
musical example to illustrate my point.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Prokofiev’s
first symphony, completed in 1917, was marked by imitation. As the composer confesses
in his autobiography:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">I had in
mind the thought of writing a symphony in the style of Haydn … If Haydn were
living today, I thought, he would keep to his way of writing, while at the same
time incorporating some newer ideas. I wanted to compose just such a symphony
--- a symphony in the classical style. I finally gave it the name </span></i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Symphonie classique
--- <i>firstly because it was so simple: also in the hope of annoying</i> <i>the Philistines, and in the secret desire to
win in the end, if the symphony should prove itself to be a genuine ‘classic’.</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">The last sentence is intriguing, particularly
because of the combination of the word ‘genuine’ and the word ‘classic’ in scare
quotes. Prokofiev’s first symphony can never be a genuine classic, but it can
be a genuine ‘classic’. As a matter of fact, the symphony was well-received and
is still enjoyed by classical music lovers today. It is not felt to be ridiculous,
false, incongruous, or monstrous.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Is this a counterexample to Kundera’s
view? There is no simple answer to the question. On the one hand, Prokofiev
himself admitted that he imitated Haydn and tried to write a symphony in the
classical style; on the other hand, it could be maintained that the symphony is
not ridiculed because there are enough “newer ideas” in it to distinguish it from
a <i>mere</i> imitation --- the classical
style is more apparent than real.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">In any case, we can still distinguish
between the aesthetic experience one has when listening to the symphony and the
judgment one may make about the aesthetic value of the piece. Even if the aesthetic
judgment has to be made within the context of the historical evolution of the
symphony as a form of art, it does not follow that the aesthetic experience
cannot be independent of such a context. We don't have to deny that aesthetic judgment can affect aesthetic experience, but we can at
least imagine that someone who knows nothing about Haydn, Prokofiev, or the
classical style may still enjoy Prokofiev’s <i>Symphonie
classique</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">The following is the charming, and
very short, third movement of the symphony; experience it yourself:<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><br /></span></div>
<iframe allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" frameborder="0" height="300" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/uoSM8jLbwhA?feature=player_detailpage" width="505"></iframe>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-41964606130466321512012-09-09T19:31:00.000-07:002012-09-09T19:31:11.342-07:00The curious case of Binjamin Wilkomirski (Part II)<span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Sometimes an identity of a
person has so many elements or aspects that it is not always easy to tell what
it is about that identity that contributes to the meaningfulness of the person’s
life. We have seen that it was by seeing himself as Wilkomirski the sufferer-survivor-reporter
that Grosjean found meaning in his life. The fact that he was not really the
sufferer or the survivor implies that he was not a genuine reporter either </span></span><span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Symbol;">¾</span></span><span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> something that did not take place could not be reported. Yes,
Grosjean was still the author of the book, but this was not an element of the
identity in question that could contribute to the meaningfulness of his life,
for the book was not what it was supposed to be. By contrast, if Grosjean’s
book had been published as a novel, then his identity as the author of the book
could have contributed to the meaningfulness of his life.</span></span><br />
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Grosjean’s case reminds me
of a friend who is a devoted Christian minister, who presumably believes that
his life is meaningful by virtue of his identity as a Christian minister, or,
in his own words, as God’s servant. Let us imagine that in the last few years
of his life he became skeptical about his religious beliefs and finally gave
them up (this is, I have to say, extremely unlikely to happen). Suppose there
were no other identities he identified himself with; should he then believe
that his life was meaningless? It depends. On the one hand, he had to say that
since there is no God, no one can be God’s servant. On the other hand, there
might be other elements in his identity as a Christian minister that could
contribute to the meaningfulness of his life. For example, he might have, in his
capacity as a minister, helped a lot of people deal with their personal
problems. If he himself valued this element of his identity as a minister, and
other people valued it too, then his life could still be meaningful by virtue
of his identity as a Christian minister.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">It is risky to focus on
one single identity in such a way that the meaningfulness of your life depends solely
on it. If you have only one identity that you think makes your life meaningful,
and if something goes wrong with respect to that identity, such as if you
actually have a serious misunderstanding of the nature of that identity, or if
you suddenly do not value it any more, your life may turn out to be
meaningless. Grosjean’s is a case in point. If all goes well, then one identity
will suffice; but things do not always go well. Although not all our identities
are chosen by us, some are. It is thus wise, as far as the meaningfulness of
our lives is concerned, to develop what psychologist Daniel Nettle calls
‘self-complexity’. As Nettle explains, “if I am just an academic, and I have an
academic setback, then my whole self seems less efficacious and worthwhile.
However, if I have many other facets to myself, then the effect of the setback
on my identity is much less severe” (<i>Happiness:
The Science Behind Your Smile</i>, p.156). He speaks in the context of discussing
happiness, but it is clear that the same point applies to meaningfulness.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The above point about
self-complexity may give us some ideas about how to live a meaningful life. This
may also be true of the final point I would like to make, which is that a
meaningful life consists in living it rather than in thinking about how to live
it. Part of Grosjean’s problem might be that he was too much aware of the
problem of meaningfulness and tried too hard to make his life meaningful. There
is such a thing as thinking too much and too often about the problem about meaningfulness.
This may be what Wittgenstein means when he writes:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 9pt 0in;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">The way to solve the
problem you see in life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic
disappear. … a man who lives rightly won’t experience the problem as sorrow, so
for him it will not be a problem, but a joy rather; in other words for him it
will be a bright halo round his life, not a dubious background.</span></i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"> (<i>Culture
and Value</i>, p.27)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-32989123628909729982012-08-15T13:09:00.001-07:002012-08-15T13:27:22.829-07:00The curious case of Binjamin Wilkomirski (Part I)<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In 1995, a book entitled
</span><span class="apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><i>Bruchstücke. Aus
einer Kindheit 1939–1948</i></span><span class="apple-converted-space" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> was published in Germany (</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">the English translation
of the book, published in 1996, was entitled </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">)</span><span class="apple-converted-space" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. The name of the author
was Binjamin Wilkomirski, and the book was a vivid and supposedly accurate account
of his horrifying experiences as a very young Polish Jewish boy in two Nazi
concentration camps. Being an appealing survivor’s tale with high literary
quality, the book quickly became an international best-seller and received
numerous awards. Wilkomirski gave readings of the book everywhere, was
interviewed on TV, met with and spoke to other Holocaust survivors publicly,
and participated in academic symposiums on the book or on subjects concerning
the Holocaust. He was compared to Anne Frank; if his story was not more moving,
it was certainly more satisfying and probably more inspiring, for he survived
while Frank did not.</span><br />
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">But then it turned out
that nothing described in the book about that little Jewish boy had ever
happened. The author was not even Jewish, and his real name was ‘Bruno Grosjean’,
not the obviously Jewish ‘Binjamin Wilkomirski’. Grosjean was a Swiss who had
been born to an unmarried woman and later adopted by a childless couple, and who
grew up to be a professional (but not outstanding) clarinetist. He was born in
1941, the year one of the concentration camps in which the story happened began
to operate, and he had never left Switzerland before adulthood. The ‘memoir’
was based on history books, magazines, and novels Grosjean had read, as well as
films he had seen. His account was first questioned by a Swiss journalist named
Daniel Ganzfrield, whose arguments against the authenticity of it were,
however, considered by some to be inconclusive. The Swiss historian Stefan
Maechler was later commissioned by Wilkomirski/Grosjean’s literacy agency to
investigate the matter, and Maechler proved in great detail that many of the
things described in Grosjean’s book contradicted historical facts.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Graosjean’s book was not
the first autobiography of an alleged Holocaust survivor that turned out to be a fraud,
nor was it the last. What makes Grosjean’s case more interesting and relevant
to our discussion is that Grosjean might actually believe, or at least believe
that he believed, the story he told in his book. Grosjean certainly knew that
he grew up in Switzerland, but he also knew that he was an adopted child. If he
did not remember much the first few years of his life, it was not impossible
for him to believe that he was a traumatized child rescued from the war and
exchanged for a child named ‘Bruno Grosjean’. As social psychologists Carol
Tavris and Elliot Aronson understand the Wilkomirski/Grosjean case, “Grosjean
spent more than twenty years transforming himself into Wilkomirski; writing <i>Fragments</i> was the last step of his
metamorphosis into a new identity, not the first step of a calculated lie”
(Tavris & Elliot, </span></span><i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me)</span></i><span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">, p.84).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Let us assume that Tavris’s
and Aronson’s understanding of the Wilkomirski/Grosjean case is correct. What Tavris
and Aronson say next relates the case to the problem about meaningfulness: “Wilkomirski’s
new <i>identity</i> as a survivor of the
Holocaust gave him a powerful sense of <i>meaning</i>
and purpose, along with the adoration and support of countless others”. Grosjean’s
book was, according to Tavris and Aronson, a result of “a quest for meaning in
his life” (ibid., italics added). They presumably do not have a fully developed theory of a
meaningful life like mine when they relate the meaningfulness of Grosjean’s
life to his identity, but their description of the case fits quite well the
account of a meaningful life I have suggested: Grosjean’s sense of
meaningfulness came from his newly found identity, which was valued not only by
himself but also by others; and it was this newly found identity that allowed
him to evaluate his life positively, that gave him directions for how he should
live his life, that he could see as the reason for his existence, and that he
happily believed to be who he really was.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">What exactly was
Grosjean’s newly found identity which he thought made his life meaningful? It
may appear that the answer is straightforward: it was his identity as a Holocaust
survivor, or more precisely, his identity as a Jewish boy who suffered from his
experiences in Nazi concentration camps and survived. But suffering in itself
does not give meaning to a life. We would not say that the lives of all the
Jews who were tortured and murdered in concentration camps were meaningful
lives simply by virtue of their suffering, nor would we say that at least the
lives of those who survived were meaningful simply by virtue of their suffering
<i>and</i> their survival. What Grosjean
thought made his life meaningful was his identity as the young Holocaust
survivor who lived to tell his story, which inspired and moved a lot of people.
According to Maechler, Grosjean “truly blossomed in his role as a concentration-camp
victim, for it was in it that he finally found himself”, but what we should note
is that “[v]ideotapes and eyewitness reports of Wilkomirski’s <i>presentations</i> give the impression of a
man made euphoric by his own <i>narrative</i>”
(Maechler, </span></span><i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">The Wilkomirski Affair: A Study in
Biographical Ttruth</span></i><span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">, p.273, note 14, italics
added). It was not being the sufferer, not being the sufferer-survivor, but
being the sufferer-survivor-<i>reporter</i>,
that counted for the meaningfulness of Wilkomirski’s life.*<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">* </span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">If
you are inclined to disagree, just imagine that Anne Frank survived but had not
written her wartime diary, or that she had written the diary but neither she
nor the diary survived. Would Frank’s life have been as meaningful as it
actually was?</span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><br /></span></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-14179995848860583812012-08-05T22:08:00.001-07:002012-08-05T23:00:53.782-07:00Meaningfulness and divine purpose<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[Although
I do not believe that God exists, in what follows I will, for simplicity, sometimes
speak as if God exists. I will also assume that it is compatible with God’s
nature that God has purposes or plans.]</span><br />
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">Some
people believe that a human life is meaningful only if it fulfills God’s purpose
(call it <i>divine purpose</i>). There are
two ways in which we can be related to divine purpose. In the first way, God
created us to serve a particular purpose, just as a watch is made to serve the
purpose of telling time; there is a divine purpose <i>in us</i>. In the second way,
God did not create us to serve a particular purpose, but God has some purpose or
plan which we can participate in, just as we can participate in an author’s
purpose of writing a book to raise consciousness about global warming </span><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-char-type: symbol; mso-hansi-font-family: Arial; mso-symbol-font-family: Symbol;">¾</span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">
by reading the book. These two ways do not have to be independent of each
other, for God could create us to serve a particular purpose such that we can
participate in another purpose God has simply by fulfilling the former purpose.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">It
is obvious that divine purpose is not sufficient for meaningfulness. The mere
fact that God created us to serve a particular purpose does not imply that our
lives are meaningful, for we may fail to serve that purpose. Likewise, the mere
fact that God has some purpose or plan that we can participate in does not
imply that our lives are meaningful either, for we may fail to participate in
it. In either case, even given the divine purpose, whether our lives are
meaningful still depends on what we do.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">So
what we should examine is whether divine purpose is necessary for meaningfulness.
Let us begin with Kurt Baier’s well-known criticism of the view in question;
his criticism concerns only the first way in which we are related to divine
purpose. According to Baier, no human being’s life can be meaningful by virtue
of being used to fulfill another being’s purpose, even when that being is God. As
he elaborates:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">To attribute to a
human being a purpose in that sense is not neutral, let alone complimentary: it
is offensive. It is degrading for a man to be regarded as merely serving a
purpose. If, at a garden party, I ask a man in livery, ‘What is your purpose?’
I am insulting him. I might as well have asked, ‘What are you for?’ Such
questions reduce him to the level of a gadget, a domestic animal, or perhaps a
slave. I imply that we allot to him the tasks, the goals, the aims which he is
to pursue; that his wishes and desires and aspirations and purposes are to
count for little or nothing. We are treating him, in Kant’s phrase, merely as a
means to our ends, not as an end in himself. </span></i><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">(Baier, “The Meaning of Life”, p.120)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">How
forceful we consider Baier’s criticism to be depends on whether we agree with
him that God, by creating human beings to serve a particular purpose, treats
them merely as a means. When we treat another human being as a means to our end,
but not merely so, we do not necessarily degrade him. I treat, for example, my
piano teacher as a means to my end of learning to play the piano, but my
treating him that way does not degrade him, for I also treat him as an
independent individual who has his own wishes and desires and aspirations and
purposes that have nothing to do with his being my piano teacher. It can be
argued, however, that if God created us to serve a particular purpose, then God
can only treat us merely as a means. If my piano teacher decided not to give me
piano lessons any more, I could still treat him respectfully as a valuable
independent individual in many other ways (as a good pianist, as a polymath, as
a loving and devoted father, etc.) that have nothing to do with the ends I
have. But if God created me to serve a particular purpose and I decided not to
fulfill that purpose, there does not seem to be anything else in me which would
allow God to see me not as bad (on some religious understanding I would indeed
be considered by God to be so bad that I deserve eternal punishment) </span><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 11.0pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-char-type: symbol; mso-hansi-font-family: Arial; mso-symbol-font-family: Symbol;">¾</span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">
God would see me in the way a watchmaker sees a broken watch.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">Divine purpose and meaningfulness can be related by the idea
that, in Nozick’s words, “[a]ttempts to find meaning in life seek to transcend
the limits of an individual life” (<i>Philosophical
Explanations</i>, p.597). If God created us to serve a particular purpose or if
we can participate in God’s purpose or plan, then we will be able to transcend
the limits of our lives by serving God's purpose or participating in his purpose or plan. We will be, in a sense, bigger than our earthly lives
allow us to see ourselves.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;">But the problem with this view is that transcending
the limits of our lives this way does not imply that our lives will then have
no limits. The only being who is not limited in any way is God. If being
unlimited were necessary for meaningfulness, then only God’s life could be
meaningful. Accordingly, our lives would after all not be meaningful even if we
fulfilled God’s purpose (in either way or both ways). On the other hand, if meaningfulness
does not require being unlimited but requires only that we transcend the limits
of our lives in some way, then it is not clear why we have to fulfill a divine
purpose in order to transcend the limits of our lives. That is, it is not clear
why transcending the limits of our lives in the earthly way does not count at
all for meaningfulness. Consider a composer who wrote good (but not great)
music, influenced and inspired many other composers to write better music of a
certain style, and thereby started an important tradition of music. There is a
clear sense in which he transcended the limits of his life as a composer, and
such transcendence does not have to do with any divine purpose. If transcending
the limits of our lives is necessary for meaningfulness while meaningfulness
does not require being unlimited, why should we think that the composer’s way of
transcending his limits count for nothing with respect to the meaningfulness of
his life? Why should we think that in order for his life to be meaningful he must
also transcend the limits of human life as such rather than merely the limits
of his life?<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt;"><br /></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-38584270016974947412012-07-30T01:26:00.000-07:002012-07-30T01:26:45.426-07:00Does size matter?<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">There
is a kind of reflection that would incite people to look for grand meaningfulness,
the kind of meaningfulness that we presumably cannot find in the lives we are
living here and now. Bertrand Russell expresses such reflection vividly in the
following remarks:</span><br />
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">In the visible world,
the Milky Way is a tiny fragment; within this fragment, the solar system is an
infinitesimal speck, and of this speck our planet is a microscopic dot. On this
dot, tiny lumps of impure carbon and water, of complicated structure, with
somewhat unusual physical and chemical properties, crawl about for a few years,
until they are dissolved again into the elements of which they are compounded.
They divide their time between labour designed to postpone the moment of
dissolution for themselves and frantic struggles to hasten it for others of
their kind.</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">
(Russell, “Dreams and Facts”, reprinted in his <i>Sceptical Essays</i>)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Compared
with Russell’s description of how small we are, which seems accurate, the usual
metaphor that human beings are tiny specks in a vast universe seems an
exaggeration of our size. If even the solar system is only a tiny speck, how
should we describe our smallness? However, what we should ask in this
connection is rather the question “What does the size of us have to do with the
meaningfulness of our lives?”. It does not seem that meaningfulness depends on
the relative size of our existence. If I think my life is meaningful, I would
not think that it was less meaningful simply because I had come to believe that
the universe had become several hundred million times bigger (while my size did
not change). As Frank Ramsey so pithily puts it, “[t]he stars may be large, but
they cannot think or love” (see “Epilogue” of his <i>Philosophical Papers</i>). Whether our lives are meaningful or not depends
on what we do and think and feel, rather than on how big or small we are.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">But
then why do some people think the relative size of our existence matters to the
meaningfulness of our lives, or more specifically, why do some people think our
smallness implies that our lives as such are meaningless? I think the most
reasonable answer is that when people think in this way, they see their
smallness as a kind of limit of their lives. Death can be understood along the
same lines </span><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 11pt;">¾</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;"> death is a temporal limit of life. Our
smallness is, by contrast, not just a spatial limit, but also a limit to our
abilities: being so utterly small relative to the universe, we are confined to
the extremely tiny space we are in and not able to achieve much even within
that tiny space. There is no better expression of this understanding of how
limits of a life and meaningfulness are related than the following passage by Robert
Nozick:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Consider the most
exalted and far-researching life or role imagined for man: being the messiah.
Greater effect has been imagined for no other man. Yet still we can ask how
important it is to bring whatever it is the messiah brings to the living beings
of the third planet of a minor off-center star in the Milky Way galaxy, itself
a galaxy of no special distinction within its particular metagalaxy, one of
many in the universe. Te see something’s limits, to see it as that limited
particular thing or enterprise, is to question its meaning.</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;"> (Nozick, <i>Philosophical Explanations</i>, p.597)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">On
this understanding,“[t]he problem of meaning is created by limits, by being
just this, by being merely this”, and “[a]ttempts to find meaning in life seek
to transcend the limits of an individual life. The narrower the limits of a
life, the less meaningful it is” (pp.594-595). Hence the quest for grand
meaningfulness.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;"><br /></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-39713918709792095502012-07-10T12:17:00.000-07:002012-07-10T12:43:44.298-07:00Meaningfulness and happiness<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">When we are thinking
about meaningfulness, we may be inclined to see it as </span><i style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">the most important</i><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;"> thing we care about, or should care about, in
our lives. I certainly think that meaningfulness is an important issue, and
that the meaningfulness of my life is very important to me, but I am not sure I
would say that meaningfulness should be considered the most important thing in
our lives. Many people do not give any thought to meaningfulness. And even for
those who do seek meaningfulness, there is at least another thing they seek,
and should seek, equally mightily, namely, </span><i style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">happiness</i><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">.
It takes reflection to see the need we have for meaningfulness, while happiness
is something we naturally, or even blindly, pursue. Is there any relation
between meaningfulness and happiness? Of course the answer depends on how we
understand happiness, but it is common for people to think that a meaningful
life must be in some sense a happy life. In some sense, yes, but there are also
other senses of happiness in which a meaningful life is not necessarily a happy
one.</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">As Susan Wolf
observes, meaningful lives may “frequently involve stress, danger, exertion, or
sorrow” (“</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Happiness
and meaning: two aspects of the good life”, <i>Social
Philosophy and Policy</i>,</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;"> 14, p.209), all of which
are incompatible with pleasure. Wolf understands meaningful lives as “lives of
active engagement in projects of worth” (ibid.); it is not difficult to see why
such engagement does not always give us pleasure --- is not necessarily happy
in the hedonistic sense.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">As long as happiness is understood phenomenologically, that is, in terms of
some of the subject’s positive feelings, states of mind, or experiences, it
seems that we can always imagine that a person whose life is meaningful does
not have any such feelings, states of mind, or experiences. It is, I think,
true that a meaningful life is usually accompanied by a sense of fulfillment. Although
fulfillment is not the same as happiness, it, as Wolf rightly maintains,
“deserves an important place in an adequate theory of happiness” and should be
considered “a major component of happiness” (ibid., p.220). Nevertheless, there
is still no guarantee that living a meaningful life will give one a sense of
fulfillment. Even for Wolf, who thinks that “the links between meaningfulness
and fulfillment are tight” (ibid.), there is no such guarantee, for she can
only say that “[n]ine times out of ten, perhaps ninety-nine times out of a
hundred, a meaningful life will be happier [through having a sense of fulfillment]
than a meaningless one” (ibid., p.222). Ninety or ninety-nine percent is still
not one-hundred percent, though it may well be good enough.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">It
is even clearer that a meaningful life does not imply happiness when happiness
is understood as objective well-being rather than in terms of subjective
positive experiences. A meaning life is not necessarily a life that prospers or
goes well, or a life in which most of one’s important desires are satisfied, or
a life in which one enjoys a high quality of life (materialistically
construed), or a life full of great achievements. I cannot agree more with the
following remarks by Harry Frankfurt:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">A life may be full of
meaning, then, and yet so gravely deficient in other ways that no reasonable
person would choose to live it. It cannot even be assumed that a meaningful
life must always be preferable to one that lacks meaning. What fills a certain
life with meaning may be some intricate and demanding conflict, or a terribly
frustrating but compelling struggle, which involves a great deal of anxiety or
pain and which is extremely destructive. Thus the very circumstances that make
the life meaningful may be deeply objectionable. It might be better to live an
empty life than to generate or to endure so much suffering and disorder. </span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">(<i>Necessity, Volition, and Love</i>, CUP, p.85)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Viktor
Frankl may be right when he says that “[t]here is nothing in the world […] that
would so effectively help one to survive even the worst conditions as the
knowledge that there is a meaning in one’s life” (<i>Man's Search for Meaning</i>, Simon & Schuster, p.109), but for a
more balanced understanding of the importance of meaningfulness we have to keep
in mind that there could be conditions so bad that nothing could help one
survive them, not even the knowledge that there is a meaning in one’s life. To
think otherwise is to romanticize human nature.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Some
may insist that a meaningful life is necessarily better than a meaningless
life. Although we do not have to object to this, we should notice that
meaningfulness is only one dimension of the evaluation of life. As far as this
dimension of evaluation is concerned, it is true that a meaningful life is
always better than a meaningless life. Indeed, it is true trivially, for this
dimension of evaluation is understood by us in such a way that ‘meaningful’ is on
the positive side of it and ‘meaningless’ on the negative side (and a gray area
in between). In any case, there are other dimensions of the evaluation of life,
such as happiness, with ‘happy’ on the positive side and ‘unhappy’ on the
negative side (and a gray area in between). It is possible for the very same
life to be placed on the positive side of one dimension of evaluation while
being placed on the negative side of another dimension. This is what happens
when a life is meaningful but unhappy. It is not always clear which dimension of
evaluation should trump which: in some cases it might be better to live a happy
life that is not meaningful than live a meaningful life that is unhappy, but <i>vice versa</i> in other cases.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;"><br /></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-38303325129923191482012-06-30T14:34:00.000-07:002012-06-30T14:34:20.721-07:00Bookmash<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhnOH0pMDa-oQQkMppsR-_agiLoSaCQIUceedHj4mDByKM9XVLCL5cZeul2TdGf0X9s5266dfpe3n32zpBjn1SS2lLs8vRzcEnV3a9Mk5zcIoRoLhZasfQFWMo0x0GANw4GWYe-kL2YLpU/s1600/bookmash.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhnOH0pMDa-oQQkMppsR-_agiLoSaCQIUceedHj4mDByKM9XVLCL5cZeul2TdGf0X9s5266dfpe3n32zpBjn1SS2lLs8vRzcEnV3a9Mk5zcIoRoLhZasfQFWMo0x0GANw4GWYe-kL2YLpU/s320/bookmash.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
Promises, promises,</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
Diary of a bad year.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
Faking it, self to self,</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
The seas of language,</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
The mysterious flame.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
Walking the tightrope of reason</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
Climbing Mount Improbable,</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
I am a strange loop.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-left: 2.0in;">
<br /></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-64201756296042657832012-06-21T13:32:00.000-07:002012-06-22T21:46:46.388-07:00Easier said than done?In the following passage from his well-known essay on English style, <a href="http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/politics/english/e_polit/" target="_blank">"Politics and the English Language"</a>, Geroge Orwell points out some features of a pretentious style:<br />
<br />
<i>The keynote [of a pretentious style] is the elimination of simple verbs. Instead of being a single word, such as </i>break, stop, spoil, mend, kill, <i>a verb becomes a </i>phrase<i>, made up of a noun or adjective tacked on to some general-purpose verb such as </i>prove, serve, form, play, render.<i> In addition, the passive voice is wherever possible used in preference to the active, and noun constructions are used instead of gerunds (</i>by examination of <i>instead of</i> by examining<i>). The range of verbs is further cut down by means of the </i>-ize<i> and </i>de-<i>formations, and the banal statements are given an appearance of profundity by means of the </i>not un-<i>formation.</i><br />
<br />
The message seems clear: use verbs and the active voice wherever possible. However, in this very passage Orwell himself does not practice what he preaches. He uses phrases like "the elimination of", "in preference to", and "an appearance of" (instead of "eliminate", "prefer", and "appear"); he also uses the passive voice several times in this short passage, and once in the very sentence in which he mentions the passive voice as a feature of a pretentious style.<br />
<br />
This has been noticed (the passive!) by Joseph M. Williams, and he rewrites the Orwell passage, avoiding noun constructions as well as the passive voice:<br />
<br />
<i>Those who write pretentiously eliminate simple verbs. Instead of using one word, such as </i><span style="background-color: white;">break, stop, spoil, mend, kill, <i>they turn a verb into a noun or adjective and then tack it on to a general-purpose verb such as </i></span><span style="background-color: white;">prove, serve, form, play, render. <i>Wherever possible, they use the passive voice instead of the active and noun constructions instead of gerunds </i></span><i>(</i><span style="background-color: white;">by examination of</span><span style="background-color: white;"> </span><i>instead of</i><span style="background-color: white;"> by examining</span><i>). They cut down the range of verbs further with </i><span style="background-color: white;">-ize</span><i> and </i><span style="background-color: white;">de-<i>, and try to make banal statements seem profound by the </i></span><span style="background-color: white;">not un-</span><i>formation. </i>(Williams, <i>Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity & Grace</i>, fourth edition, p.6)<br />
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Orwell is a terrific writer, and presumably a very self-aware one. It is reasonable to think that he uses the passive voice and noun constructions here on purpose. More importantly, the Orwell passage does not sound pretentious, nor is the Williams rewrite an improvement on it. The reason is, I think, that the subject matter of the Orwell passage is a certain writing style, but the Williams rewrite makes it sound like it is about the people who write in such a style. If the subject is the style rather than the people, then it is difficult to avoid the passive voice and noun constructions.<br />
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What we learn from this example is that good writing is not simply a matter of following some rules or principles. There may be rules or principles that you should follow, but what makes you a good writer is your knowing when to break them.<br />
<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4780378951044618286.post-14839061916091498042012-05-15T00:03:00.001-07:002012-05-21T08:02:36.314-07:00A note on omnipotence<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">There are
people who think the following argument proves that an omnipotent being is
logically impossible:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Argument A:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(A1) For
any x, if x is capable of creating a stone that x cannot lift, then x is not
omnipotent (because it is incapable of lifting such a stone).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(A2) For
any x, if x is incapable of creating a stone that x cannot lift, then x is not
omnipotent (because there is something that it is incapable of doing).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(A3)</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">For any x, either x is
capable of creating a stone that x cannot lift, or x is incapable of doing so.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(A4)</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Therefore, an omnipotent
being is logically impossible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">This
is an appealing argument, but (A2) is problematic. Consider the following
argument:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Argument B: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(B1) In any
possible world in which x is omnipotent, there is no stone that x cannot lift.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(B2) Therefore,
there is no possible world in which x is omnipotent and in which there is a
stone that x cannot lift.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(B3) Therefore, “x
is omnipotent and there is a stone that x cannot lift” (S) is impossible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(B4) For any x, if
x is omnipotent, then what it is for x to create a stone that x cannot lift is
for x to actualize (S).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(B5) Therefore,
for any x, if x is omnipotent, then what it is for x to create a stone that x
cannot lift is for x to actualize something impossible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(B6) Even if a
being is omnipotent, it is incapable of actualizing the impossible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(B7) Therefore, for any x, if x is omnipotent, then
it is incapable of creating a stone that x cannot lift.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Let us
symbolize (B7) as “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ox </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">
Ix)”. Premise (A2) can then be symbolized as “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ix </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> ~Ox)”, which is equivalent to “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ox </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> ~Ix)”.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">If
argument B is sound, which I think it is, then “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ox </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> Ix)” is proven true. Will argument B then
prove that (A2) (i.e. “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ox </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">
~Ix)”) is false? Not quite, for if there are no omnipotent beings, then both “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ox </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> Ix)” and “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ox </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> ~Ix)” are true.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">But that
doesn’t mean (A2) is not problematic as a premise of argument A. Here is how I
see the dialectic: “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ox </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">
Ix)” is true whether there is an omnipotent being, while “(</span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">"</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">x)(Ox </span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">®</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> ~Ix)” is true <i>only if</i> there are no omnipotent beings. For this reason, (A2) should
not be taken as obviously true and needs to be defended.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">A defense
of (A2) may begin with arguing that there are no omnipotent beings. Such an
argument has to be independent of argument A, for otherwise it would be
question-begging. It is, however, not clear how this can be done.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Another way is to argue for (A2) without first arguing
that there are no omnipotent beings. If there are independent grounds for
arguing for (A2), then those can be used, and the argument for (A2) will also
be an argument for the non-existence of omnipotent beings. Argument A will then be used to argue for a stronger conclusion, namely, that an
omnipotent being is logically impossible. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In any case, (A2) can’t just be assumed without argument.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com18